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Resumen: Trabajo que aborda el relato filosófico Hayy ibn Yaqzan, titulado así 
por el héroe de la historia y escrito por el filósofo musulmán Ibn Tufayl (1105-
1185). Fue la primera novela árabe y se anticipó a obras europeas como 
Robinson Crusoe, de Daniel Defoe, y Emile, de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, así como 
al pensamiento de varios filósofos occidentales, incluidos Locke y Kant. Este 
artículo investiga los temas filosóficos contenidos en la novela, centrados en las 
cuestiones filosóficas clave de “¿qué podemos saber?” Y “¿cómo podemos 
saber?” Estas preguntas acompañan al ser humano desde el comienzo de la 
filosofía y siguen siendo importantes actualmente con un debate tan polémico 
sobre la veracidad de la experiencia no empírica. 
 
Palabras clave: Neoplatonismo. Iluminacionismo. Marifa. Orientalismo. 
 
Abstract: This is the philosophical tale Hayy ibn Yaqzan, named after the hero 
of this story and written by the Muslim philosopher Ibn Tufayl (1105-1185). It 
was the first Arabic novel, and anticipated such European works as Daniel 
Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile, as well as the 
thought of a number of western philosophers including Locke and Kant. This 
paper will bring out the philosophical themes contained within the novel, 
centred on those key philosophical questions of ‘what can we know?’ and ‘how 
can we know?’. These questions have been with us since the beginning of 
philosophy and continue to be important today with such contentious debate 
concerning the veracity of non-empirical experience. 
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1. The Novel: A short summary 
After Ibn Tufayl’s introduction to the novel, he tells a story of a remote and 
uninhabited equatorial island, lying off the coast of India, which neighbours a 
much larger island that is populated by a people ruled by a king. This king had a 
sister and, he being the possessive kind, would not allow her to marry without 
his permission. However, she secretly married someone she loved called 
Yaqzan (‘wide-awake’) and she give birth to a son, Hayy (‘Alive’), hence Hayy 
ibn Yaqzan (‘Alive, son of Awake’)1. Afraid that the king would discover the 
child, she cast the baby into the sea on a raft. This arrived on the smaller 
neighbouring island. The baby is discovered by a doe, which provides milk for 
the infant and raises him. The child learned to walk when he was two and, 
living among the deer, he imitated their habits and mimicked their calls.  
The doe dies when Hayy is just seven years of age, but he survives by using 
his reason. For example, Hayy dissects the doe to find out what happened to 
her. It is this process of reasoned enquiry, in total isolation from other human 
beings, that leads Hayy into a journey for ultimate truth. As he grows older, 
Hayy becomes more reflective and, unlike the animals that he shares his habitat 
with that remain firmly within the physical world, he begins to question his 
existence and to speculate upon the metaphysical and in God. By the age of 42, 
Hayy is able to have a direct experience of God and devotes the rest of his life 
in retreat from the physical world. This, however, is interrupted when Hayy is 
50 years of age by the arrival on the island of Absal, who comes from a 
neighbouring island to seek isolation from others. When Hayy and Absal meet, 
being unable to understand each other through a common language and 
coming from very different environments, nonetheless realise that they both 
believe in the same God.  
 
2. Ibn Tufayl 
From the historical records, little is known about Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Malik ibn Muhammad ibn Tufail al-Qaisi al-Andalusi (c.1105-1185), or 
Ibn Tufayl for short2. What we do know is that he was an Andalusian Muslim 
philosopher, physician, politician, and novelist. He was born in the small 
Spanish town of Guadix (then called Wadi Ash), which is about 50 miles 
northeast of Granada, although his name does tell us that he was originally 
descended from the distinguished Arabian tribe of Qais. At this time, Andalusia 
was a rich cultural milieu, and Ibn Tufayl was not short of access to 
                                         
1 Actually, previous to this, Ibn Tufayl speculates over the possibility that Hayy ibn Yaqzan could 
have come into being by spontaneous generation, without any mother or father at all. 
2 In the West, the Latinised name is Abubacher. 
Hayy ibn Yaqzan: Una novela filosófica de Ibn Tufayl 
 Alfinge 29 (2017), 83-101 85 
philosophers, going back to the Greeks but, more directly, his teacher the 
Spanish Muslim philosopher and astronomer Ibn Bajjah (Avempace or 
Avenassar, 1085-1138). He was also greatly influenced by Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 
c.980-1037), the Aristotelian Muslim philosopher al-Farabi (Alpharabius, c.872-
950), and the theologian, philosopher and mystic al-Ghazali (Algazel, 1058-
1111). 
Ibn Tufayl was minister to the governor of Granada and other members of 
the Almohad dynasty, achieving the prestigious post of vizier (a chief minister) 
and chief royal physician to the Almohad Sultan Abu Yaqub Yusuf. The Sultan 
was something of an intellectual himself and liked to surround himself with 
scholars and their books. It was Ibn Tufayl who recommended Averroes to 
Yaqub, and Averroes himself reports of this first meeting: 
 
The first question addressed to me by the commander of 
the believers, after inquiring about my name, my father’s 
name and my pedigree, was: “What are the philosophers’ 
views about heaven [the world], is it eternal or created?” 
So abashed and terrified did I feel that I began to offer 
excuses, even denying that I ever dealt with philosophy. I 
had no idea then what the sultan-caliph and ibn Tufayl 
had in mind for me… (Marrakushi, 1881: 174-175) 
 
Averroes’ concern is understandable, for to take a side on such doctrinal 
issues can lead to either royal patronage or banishment, depending upon which 
answer is given. Fortunately for Averroes, the enlightened Sultan seemed 
satisfied enough to appoint him as his new physician to succeed Ibn Tufayl 
when he retired in 1182. It was also due to Ibn Tufayl that Averroes was 
commissioned to complete the ambitious project of writing commentaries on 
the works of Aristotle which were to have such an immense influence of 
philosophy in the West. Ibn Tufayl died in 1185 in Marrakesh and, although he 
wrote textbooks on medicine and astronomy, as well as poetry, it is his work 
Hayy Ibn Yaqzan for which he is predominantly known for.  
 
3. Philosophical Context 
When the Arabs conquered Syria and Iraq in the seventh century they 
encountered a number ancient Greek schools of philosophy there, the most 
famous being Antioch, Harran, Edessa Nisibis, and Qinnesrin. These centres 
were largely Christian, with the exception of Harran in Northern Syria, which 
was the home of a group referred to by the Arabs as Sabaeans; a now-extinct 
nature-cult who are mentioned in the Quran as worshippers of the Sun. What 
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these schools did was to translate Greek works, many deriving from Alexandria, 
into Syriac, and so when the Arabs conquered these lands they were confronted 
with the task of translating into Arabic works that had been translated into 
Syriac from the Greek! It is perhaps inevitable that such any translations will 
result in a certain degree of interpretation, as the Arabs were, on the one hand, 
confronted with a Neoplatonic Aristotle in Alexandria and, on the other, a 
Christian Aristotle in Syria; the latter translators not being particularly 
enamoured with Plotinus’ criticism of Christians. The Arab Muslims treated 
what they found with considerable respect, referring to them as imams. The 
problem, however, is the extent to which such respect, if not reverence, for the 
Greeks such as Plato and Aristotle especially needed to be circumscribed when 
their ‘truth’ conflicted with the truth of the Quran (Jackson, 2014: 8-21)  
It required considerable ingenuity, as well as philosophical and theological 
rigour to harmonise religion with philosophy, and one of the first to engage in 
this labour was al-Farabi. He was likely born in the town of Farab in Turkestan 
and his father was said to have been a military officer in the Persian army, 
though of Turkish extraction. Al-Farabi believed that the Prophets, including 
Muhammad, were first and foremost philosophers, for it was true philosophers 
– as opposed to those with faith – who have access to ‘revelation’ in the sense 
of knowledge of God. ‘God’, for al-Farabi, was equivalent to the Active 
Intellect, not unlike Plato’s conception of the Form of the Good that is 
‘accessed’ through reason. This view of God as ‘Active Intellect’ is derived 
from a Neoplatonic conception of God. Al-Farabi’s cosmology is also touched 
by Aristotle’s spheres and Quranic references to seven heavenly mansions. It is 
this blend of Plato, Aristotle, Neoplatonism, and Islamic theology, that led the 
way in Muslim philosophy and proved to be hugely influential in Ibn Tufayl’s 
approach. 
Another important influence, and someone geographically closer, was 
Avempace. Ibn Tufayl was very familiar with a work by Avempace called The 
Hermit’s Regime or Biography of a Solitary Being (Tadbir al-Mutawahhid3) which, in 
actual fact, continues a discussion that was discussed in its Islamic perspective 
by al-Farabi in his book, On The Perfect State (Mabadi Ara Ahl Al-Madinat Al-
Fadilah). This debate, in turn, has its origins with Plato who, in the Republic 
especially, considers the role of the philosopher in the state and argues that, in 
an imperfect state, it is better for the philosopher to pursue a solitary existence. 
Ibn Bajjah considers the extent to which someone can lead a solitary life and 
achieve spiritual and intellectual fulfilment (i.e. in Neoplatonic terms, attain 
                                         
3 Ibn Bājja’s book has also been translated as The Conduct of the Solitary, and Governance of the Solitary 
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union with the Active Intellect). To what extent is society required in order to 
attain knowledge of truth? Human beings are seen as uniquely self-thinking 
intellects: at least, almost unique, with one other possible exception; that of 
God. Human beings have, it seems, this capacity for self-intellection of which 
the only other parallel is God. Intuitively, being human conjures up an image of 
something magical, mysterious and special. Human beings are ‘God-like’; we all 
partake, to some extent at least, in God’s perfection. In a solitary state, with no 
knowledge of the ‘other’, can one attain self-awareness?  
Avicenna, previous to Ibn Tufayl, wrote a much shorter allegorical tale also 
entitled Hayy ibn Yaqzan, which, though less poetic than Ibn Tufayl’s version, 
describes how Hayy arrives at ultimate truths in a virtually self-taught manner. 
It is a theme that Avicenna explores some more in his thought-experiment the 
Floating Man whereby he asks the reader to conceive oneself being created at 
once while floating in mid-air, being completely divorced from all sensations 
and with no past; no objects to perceive, including your own body. Even in 
such a state of sensory deprivation, Avicenna argued that one would still have 
self-consciousness due to the existence of a soul that is independent of sensory 
experience and the source of truth (El-Bizri, 2000). 
Because Hayy was an autodidactic, the Latin title given to this work is 
Philosophus Autodidactus, and the Latin translation, which first appeared in 1671 
(the first English translation was published in 1708), proved to be influential in 
17th and 18th century Europe in terms of philosophy and literature. Studies 
suggest that this work inspired Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (Hassan; Haque). 
In terms of philosophy, the most important influence must have been John 
Locke (1632-1704) who, in turn, was a massive influence on other Western 
philosophers. Locke was close friends and a student of the Orientalist and 
biblical scholar Edward Pococke (1604-1691) and Locke, in turn, became the 
tutor for Pococke’ son Edward Pococke the Younger (1648-1727), who 
published the Latin edition of Philosophus Autodidactus. As pointed out: 
 
On the basis of all the evidence, the conclusion is 
inescapable that not only Locke must have know the work 
[Philosophus Autodidactus], but also that he must have been 
intimately acquainted with the progress of the whole 
project. Thus the period (1667-1671), during which Locke 
began to consider the ‘problems’ of the Essay [An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding], and put them in writing 
for the first time, coincides precisely with that of the 
translation, publication and dissemination of Philosophus 
autodidactus by Edward and Dr. Pococke (Russell, 1994: 246) 
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In addition, the ideas contained within Hayy, if not directly influential, 
foreshadowed the thought of Hobbes, Hume, Berkeley, and Kant, amongst 
others.  
 
4. How are we to know God? 
One important theme, or question, that comes out of the novel is how are 
we to know God? More broadly speaking, this is a philosophical question that 
has preoccupied thinkers since the birth of philosophy, if one is to understand 
‘God’ not only in the strict monotheistic sense as understood by, in this case, 
Islam, but also in the philosophical sense - with its roots within the pre-Socratic 
tradition - of the nature of ‘Being’ and all the epistemological, moral, political, 
etc., implication that arise from such rigorous discourse. Within the field of 
philosophy of religion, there is an intellectual engagement regarding the nature 
of God, whether God exists, and, if He does exist, what does this mean for us 
as human beings and our relation to such a Being, given the seeming distance 
between the contingent, mortal, flawed, and fragile being that is Man, and the 
necessary, immortal, perfect Being that is God.  
The problem with such an intellectual engagement is the disturbing 
realisation that the human intellect proves to be limited in how far it can reach 
out. One might adopt an empirical approach to this and declare that such 
questions are meaningless, or question the empirical framework itself and look 
toward other forms of understanding. The character of Hayy is an account of 
the evolution of this one man towards an understanding of God, of getting to 
know God, and Ibn Tufayl makes use of a fictional account for the very reason 
that communicating what it means to know God is simply impossible: the best 
one can do is use the medium of fiction - with its many tools of metaphor, 
imagery and so on at its disposal - to provide the reader with some idea of 
Being. Such a technique is reminiscent of Socrates in The Republic who has no 
choice but to resort to a series of analogies in order to describe what is meant 
by the Good. Hence, Ibn Tufayl in his introduction to his work, describes the 
difficulty: 
 
Your request set off a stream of ideas in me - praise God - 
which lifted me to a state of sublimity I had never known 
before, a state so wonderful “the tongue cannot describe” 
or explain it, for it belongs to another order of being, a 
different world. But the joy, delight and bliss of this 
ecstasy are such that no one who has reached it or even 
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come near it can keep the secret or conceal the mystery. 
The light-headedness, expansiveness, and joy which seize 
him force him to blurt it out in some sweeping generality, 
for to capture it precisely is impossible (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 
95) 
 
The achievement of ‘ecstasy’, or hal in Arabic, reveals the very problem of 
describing what is indescribable, resorting to an emotional state that gives the 
human a ‘peek’ behind the curtain that reveals Being. It leaves one ‘light-
headed’ and with a feeling of ‘expansiveness’ which are key features of mystical 
experience that, during the experience itself can be emotionally charging and 
fulfilling, but can also, once this temporary state recedes, leave us feeling bereft 
and depressed over our seemingly limited and banal everyday human world. 
These moments, then, are transient, as William James duly noted and, therefore, 
leave us craving for more.  
Hayy’s craving to know God might well be categorised, then, as a mystical 
experience, but one is hesitant to label it exclusively in this way, for religion 
manifests itself in various forms that overlap and, to some degree, hybridise. 
For example, Islam as a religion manifests itself in a rational sense, and as a 
series of ritual, dogmas and laws, but its very foundation rests upon the 
Prophet Muhammad’s ‘mystical experience’ of communicating with God. 
Whilst there may be no prophets after Muhammad, the belief that such 
communication, at least to some extent, cannot be ruled out for the believer, 
raising important questions concerning the limitations of knowledge as well as 
forms of knowledge. Hayy, for his part, while being no prophet, nonetheless 
evolves as a human being, or perhaps as a ‘transhuman’, in his experience of 
God, of Being. As we note from the quote above by Ibn Tufayl, attempting to 
communicate what this experience was for Hayy will be impossible, and the 
best one can do is attempt to read in between the lines, rather like reading 
Moby Dick as an allegory for confrontation with God. Consider the account 
Hayy gives of his experience: 
 
Passing through a deep trance to the complete death-of-
self and real contact with the divine, he saw a being 
corresponding to the highest sphere, beyond which there 
is no body, a subject free of matter, and neither identical 
with the Truth and the One nor with the sphere itself, nor 
distinct from either - as the form of the sun appearing in a 
polished mirror is neither sun nor mirror, and yet distinct 
from neither. The splendor, perfection, and beauty he saw 
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in the essence of that sphere were too magnificent to be 
described and too delicate to be clothed in written or 
spoken words. But he saw it to be the pinnacle of joy, 
delight, and rapture, in blissful vision of the being of the 
Truth, glorious be His Majesty (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 152) 
 
Once again, Ibn Tufayl is wary of the limitations of language in 
communicating here, it is ‘too delicate to be clothed in written or spoken 
words’ and the emphasis that immediately precedes this description is that ‘a 
hint or a glimpse will be enough to give you some idea of the divine world, and 
if you can avoid conjuring my words in their ordinary sense’ (2009, 152-157) is 
begging the reader to not take Ibn Tufayl’s account literally and that the best 
that can be offered is a ‘hint or a glimpse’; once again a peek behind the veil. To 
describe God will not fit comfortably within the confines of logical positivism, 
of ‘ordinary language’; we have to make a Kierkegaardian leap and appreciate 
myth, story and poetry as something more than more than that; a way of 
expressing the metaphysical, of providing us with a ‘hint’. Philosophers, too, are 
not averse to such techniques. Mention has already been made of Plato, of 
course, but the brief reference to Kierkegaard is typical of the existential 
tradition, perhaps no more so than Camus and Sartre, which looks to fiction to 
express the ‘inexpressible’, even if that may not be metaphysical in all cases.  
The religious experience that Ibn Tufayl describes is an example whereby 
the faculty of reason fails us and, therefore, the knowledge provided is intuitive. 
The Arabic term here is marifa (literally ‘knowledge’) and is commonly used in 
Sufi literature. This debate as to the limitations of reason in philosophy has a 
long history, both in Islamic philosophy and in the Western tradition. Aristotle 
may well be considered more empirical than Plato and, while the latter is 
considered a ‘rationalist’, his philosophy often verges on the mystical and 
intuitive when it comes to knowledge of ultimate Reality. Interestingly, in 
Gauthier’s French translation of Hayy (Ibn Tufayl, 1992: 91, note 3) he notes 
that Ibn Tufayl’s concern with intuition predates the great Western philosopher 
Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) own concerns some 600 years later. One of 
perhaps Kant’s strangest of books is his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. Published in 
1776, it is one of Kant’s earliest writings and it is ‘strange’ because it is a 
strongly sceptical work, evidently influenced by David Hume's empiricism, but 
it is also written in a style quite different from Kant's other works, being - at 
times anyway - more playful, ironic and humorous. The 'Spirit-Seer' in the title 
is Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), the eminent Swedish scientist and 
statesman who, in 1745 at the age of 57, changed careers to become a 
theologian and mystic visionary. His most famous work is the eight-volume 
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Arcana Coelestia (Secrets of Heaven, 1749-1756), which gives accounts of his 
journeys through the spirit world where he visited heaven and hell and 
conversed with angels and demons, all of whom are the departed spirits of 
human beings or the inhabitants of other planets. The young Kant seems 
particularly annoyed that he has spent a great deal of money and time on 
buying and reading these volumes.  
Swedenborg holds that the material and spiritual worlds show themselves as 
two distinct forms of cognition. The material world appears to the senses, 
whereas the spiritual world is present to an appropriately spiritual form of 
cognition. Hence the passage from the material to the spiritual worlds is not a 
change of place but simply a change of one's mode of cognition. Kant's 
criticism is of Swedenborg, but also of mysticism as a form of cognition, of 
stretching the realms of epistemology to the mystical realm. Kant sees this as 
pseudo-philosophy and places Arab culture in this same category. Marifa, 
intuitive knowledge, is not, so far as Kant is concerned, knowledge at all. Kant 
defines human understanding as ‘a small land with many boundaries’ (Kant II: 
983), and Kant has very specific – European – boundaries for philosophy, and 
so ‘Islamic philosophy’ would be a contradiction in terms. Islam is a threat to 
Kant’s realms of reason. For Kant, his Orientalist understanding of Islam sees 
Muhammad as an over-enthusiastic visionary which results in a religion that 
lacks reason and, therefore, an ethical theology.  
In the same way Kant was critical of the philosopher who went beyond the 
boundaries of what he understood philosophy to be, the Muslim philosopher 
and theologian Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111) shared this concern in his 
The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifah), although it would be 
incorrect to equate Ghazali’s views on intuition with that of Kant. In Ghazali’s 
Incoherence he starts his work by condemning the ancient Greek philosophers; 
that their metaphysical theories are inconsistent. Avicenna and his followers, by 
essentially following in the footsteps of the ancient Greeks, are committing the 
same inconsistencies. So ‘incoherent’ here is synonymous with ‘inconsistent’: a 
fault in the logic. In fact, al-Ghazali’s fascinating short work Deliverance from 
Error (al-Munqidh min al-ḍalal) describes his own intellectual crisis, which 
resulted in him being so paralysed by doubt he was compelled to leave 
academia: 
 
…I considered the circumstances of my life, and realised 
that I was caught in a veritable thicket of attachments. I 
also considered my activities, of which the best was my 
teaching and lecturing, and realised that in them I was 
dealing in sciences that were unimportant and contributed 
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nothing to the attainment of eternal life. After that I 
examined my motive in my work of teaching, and realised 
that it was not a pure desire for the things of God, but 
that the impulse moving me…was the desire for an 
influential position and public recognition (Watt, 1953: 
21) 
 
What followed was a number of years of travelling as a Sufi. He travelled to 
Syria and Palestine, and made a pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina. He led the life of an ascetic, wearing the rough woollen clothing typical 
of the Sufi, and sleeping in mosques. Through abstinence, self-discipline, prayer 
and meditation he eventually found the peace of mind that his material success 
had not provided him, and this work, Deliverance, describes how he achieved 
direct knowledge of God through marifa.  
This form of knowledge that Hayy experiences, then, is by no means an 
uncommon experience in Islamic thought. What al-Ghazali experienced is 
described as ‘Illumination’ (Ishraq) within the Sufi tradition. The ‘Master of 
Illumination’ (‘Shaykh al-Ishraq’) was Shihāb al-Dīn Yahyā ibn Habash ibn 
Amīrak Abu’l-Futūh Suhrawardi (1154-91), or Suhrawardi for short. Suhrawardi 
was a prolific writer who aimed to bring together Islamic thought with that of 
Platonic, Neoplatonic and Persian philosophy. Like al-Ghazali, he travelled the 
Islamic world (rather, amongst the regions of the ruling Seljuk dynasty of the 
time) in search of knowledge, studying under the great mystic Majd al-Din al-Jili 
in the city of Maraghah in Azerbaijan and, even when he was appointed to the 
royal court of the Seljuk princes and rulers, he preferred to adopt the simple 
woollen attire of the Sufi khirqa.  
It is to Suhrawardi we must give credit for introducing to Islamic 
philosophy the language, the ideas, and the methodology of what is called the 
Illuminationist school, which is perhaps more traditionally (though somewhat 
unhelpfully) also referred to as the ‘Oriental’ school for which Hayy ibn Yaqzan 
is very much a part of, as Ibn Tufayl introduces the narrative: 
 
Noble brother, my dear, kind friend, God grant you 
eternal life and everlasting happiness. You have asked me 
to unfold for you, as well as I am able, the secrets of the 
oriental philosophy mentioned by the prince of 
philosophers Avicenna (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 95) 
 
Yet Suhrawardi was writing in the 12th century in Seljuk territories which 
was imbued with mystical, eastern, Oriental thought, whereas Ibn Tufayl, 
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though a contemporary of Suhrawardi, who was within an Andalusian milieu 
and, therefore, a ‘Westerner’, was making a conscious endeavour to introduce 
Eastern thought to the West as something that is not simply a product of 
Greek philosophy.  
 
…before the spread of philosophy and formal logic to the 
West all native Andalusians of any ability devoted their 
lives to mathematics. They achieved a high level in that 
field but could do no more. The next generation 
surpassed them in that they knew a little logic. But study 
logic as they may, they could not find in it the way to 
fulfilment…our own contemporaries, are as yet at a 
developmental stage, or else their development has halted 
prematurely - unless there are some of whom I don’t yet 
have a full report (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 99-100) 
 
One major worry for so many theologians especially, al-Ghazali included, 
was that Greek philosophy threatened to dilute what is Islamic, and Ibn Tufayl 
want to make a distinction between ‘falsafa’, what he saw as the philosophy that 
is more directly influenced by Plato and Aristotle especially, and what he called 
his ‘peripatetic philosophy’ as hikmat-ul-mashriqiyya. Hikmat is Semitic for 
‘wisdom’, and mashriqiyya, with its root sh-r-q related to ‘ishraqi’; Suhrawardi’s 
Illuminationism. The term mushriqiyya means largely the same thing, though Ibn 
Tufayl was substituting the ‘u’ with an ‘a’ to give his philosophy a more 
geographical location in the West.  
However, even Ibn Tufayl’s mashriqqiya is not so unadulterated, for 
Suhrawardi’s Illuminationism sought to bring together Islamic thought with 
that of Platonic, Neoplatonic and Persian philosophy. Certainly when we come 
back to the original question at the beginning of this section, how can we know 
God?, the so-called Oriental philosophy is influenced by Neoplatonic 
emanation, although Neoplatonism is, in turn, something of an eclectic school 
of thought with its roots in Persian and Indian philosophy as much as Greek 
thought. To ‘know’ God involves climbing up in the hierarchy of emanation. 
Given that Mankind - as part of the word of matter - is extremely low in this 
hierarchy, then He has a steep ladder to climb. However, Neoplatonism offers 
some optimism in that Man is not purely matter, but possesses a soul which has 
a ‘spark’ of the ‘light’ that is Being. We can see why the term ‘Illumination’ is 
used, given these references to ‘light’ as equivalent to knowledge, which is also 
reminiscent of Plato’s analogy of the sun in the Republic. Darkness, on the other 
hand, represents evil and ignorance.  
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5. Hayy’s Evolution 
Suhrawardi’s concept of the soul is very Platonic, seeing its natural home as 
belonging in the immaterial world of pure light, but, when the soul enters the 
material body, it nonetheless yearns to return to its original source. The human 
being, as represented by Hayy, is, therefore, fulfilling his or her natural function 
by purifying the soul so that it can return to the immaterial world; this is Hayy’s 
‘evolution’ from the human to the transhuman. The evolution of the soul is the 
task of the philosopher in Hayy, resulting in self-awareness, the ‘death-of-self 
and real contact with the divine’ as described in the quote above by Ibn Tufayl.  
This self-awareness is a form of knowledge in itself, the ‘intuition’ that 
Suhrawardi refers to as knowledge ‘by presence’ (al-‘ilm al-huduri al-ishraqi) to 
contrast it with knowledge that is ‘acquired’ (al-‘ilm al-husuli). The latter is 
effectively knowledge obtained through empirical experimentation, rather than 
the intuitive kind, which is more subjective, and includes dreams, visions, 
‘flashes’ of illumination, and even out-of-body experiences.  
However, Ibn Tufayl, though talking of the ‘death of self’, is also keen to 
avoid the more ecstatic, drunken Sufism of self-annihilation (fana) at the 
complete expense and loss of ‘acquired’ knowledge. Recall Hayy’s empirical 
dissection of the doe, which suggest that it is one, but important, stage in the 
evolution of Hayy’s educational development. The novel is as much concerned 
with human fulfilment and how one can learn to be human, than it is with 
knowledge of God and, of course, the two are inseparable. Once more, this is 
in line with Plato’s views on the education of the philosopher, especially with 
his famous line analogy in the Republic whereby an understanding of the 
physical, and the importance of one’s environment, seems to be a necessary 
stage in the ladder towards knowledge of the Good. Ibn Tufayl describes 
Hayy’s educational development in seven stages of seven years each, which is 
symbolic of human growth. 
Stage one, from birth to the age of seven, is one of dependence upon the 
doe, and so Hayy’s ‘self’ is yet to be developed or separate from that of the 
‘parent’. ‘She brought him to water when he was thirsty; and when the sun beat 
down she shaded him.’ (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 109). But Hayy starts to realise that 
he is not like the other deer; he has no fur to keep him warm, or antlers to 
defend himself. 
In the second stage he becomes more self-aware and independent, making 
clothes to hide his nakedness (hence the self-awareness that he is naked) and 
learning to make weapons to defend himself. In this way, Hayy became 
different from the other deer in his attire and habits, to the extent that the deer 
began to fear and avoid him, with the exception of his parent, but ageing, doe. 
Hayy ibn Yaqzan: Una novela filosófica de Ibn Tufayl 
 Alfinge 29 (2017), 83-101 95 
He also became the carer for the ageing doe, rather than the cared-for. When 
death came to the doe, Hayy was overwrought with grief and, ‘Certain that the 
organ where the hurt had settled must be in her breast, he decided to search for 
and examine it. Perhaps he would be able to get hold of the hurt and remove 
it.’ (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 113). There is also an awareness that the ‘being’ that had 
been his parent seemed something much more than the physical presence of 
the dead doe before him. 
In the third stage, his teenager years, Hayy becomes more spiritual as he 
begins to have visions of the soul. In Suhrawardi’s terms, Hayy is now moving 
up the ladder from the ‘acquired’ knowledge to the more intuitive knowledge 
‘by presence’. The Illuminationist emphasis on ‘light’ becomes more prominent 
in the tale, as Hayy discovers fire but sees it not only in the purely utilitarian 
sense of providing warmth, light and food, but in the more ‘spiritual’ sense to 
the extent that Hayy practically worships it.  
 
His new infatuation with fire, based on its power and all 
its beneficial effects, gave him the notion that what had 
abandoned his doe-mother’s heart was of the same or 
similar substance. The supposition was reinforced by his 
observation that body heat in animals was constant as 
long as they were alive, but they grew cold after 
death…By this time it was plain to him that each animal, 
although many in respect of its parts, its various senses 
and types of motion, was nonetheless one in terms of that 
spirit which stems from a single fixed place and diffuses 
from there to all the organs (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 117) 
 
Hayy’s discovery here is what Aristotle referred to as psuche (Latin anima), 
frequently translated as ‘soul’, and a concept familiar to Islamic philosophers, 
including the Aristotelian Avicenna, for whom Ibn Tufayl is similarly following 
in his thought here.  
The fourth stage is filled with wonder and opportunity for the young Hayy 
who sees the world in its variety. By the age of 21 Hayy is now dressed in the 
skins of animals and has even made his own shoes. He had dissected many 
animals and learned their nature, and by studying the habits of other animals he 
imitated them in, for example, building a food store like the swallows. He also 
engaged in farming, keeping livestock, and so moved from the hunter-gatherer 
stage, and tamed horses so he could ride them. But, aside from all these 
practical, day-to-day engagements, it is a time of Cartesian ‘soul-searching’, of 
asking questions, of seeking answers. In Platonic terms he is now starting to see 
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the Forms, but has yet to reach the ultimate Form of the Good: the prisoner 
has finally left the cave but is yet able to stare at the sun.  
 
He was now anxious to learn all he could about the soul. 
Turning his thought in this direction, he started off by 
going over in his mind all physical objects, considered not 
as bodies but as having forms from which emerge their 
distinguishing characteristics…Clearly the acts emerging 
from forms did not really arise in them, but all the actions 
attributed to them were brought about through them by 
another Being (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 124) 
 
In the fifth stage, now 28 years of age, Hayy begins to find answers to 
questions concerning the physical world through the powers of human reason, 
yet he also becomes aware of reason’s limitations. His thoughts turn to what are 
essentially classical arguments for the existence of God, for example: 
 
For he saw that if he assumed that the universe had come 
to be in time, ex nihilo, then the necessary consequence 
would be that it could not have come into existence by 
itself, but must have had a Maker to give it being (Ibn 
Tufayl, 2009: 131) 
 
From reflecting upon God in the abstract - as Cause and Maker - Hayy then 
moves to His attributes, that He is good and merciful. Through the human 
capacity to reason and reflect, Hayy reaches the limit of one’s knowledge of 
God. 
Yet there is ‘something missing’, something deeper that reason perhaps 
opens the door to further possibilities, but does not provide full access. It is 
with the sixth stage, at the age of 35, that Hayy seeks for wisdom beyond 
reason and appreciates the importance of the emotions, so often neglected or 
considered an encumbrance by the rationalist philosophers. Hence Hayy learns 
to love God and to have a passion for him. The picture of the soul presented 
here is both Platonic and Cartesian: Hayy, realising that his apprehension of 
God as an uncaused, non-physical, eternally-existing Being could not have 
derived from the human senses which could only grasp what is physical and 
contingent: 
 
Hearing catches only sounds which are generated by the 
vibrating waves of air when bodies strike together. Sight 
knows only colors; smell, odors; taste, flavors; touch, 
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textures - hard or soft, rough or smooth. Imagination too 
can apprehend only things with length, breadth and depth. 
All these are qualities predictable only of physical things 
(Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 135) 
 
Some half a century later, this is not dissimilar from what is referred to as 
Rene Descartes’ (1596-1650) Trademark Argument: 
 
[S]ince I am a thinking thing and have some idea of God, 
whatever cause is eventually assigned to me, it must be 
agreed that it is a thinking thing, and that it includes an 
idea of all the perfections that I attribute God (Descartes, 
2000: 43) 
 
As God is non-physical, the ‘faculty’ for which he perceived must also be 
non-physical: 
 
The only way to apprehend Him, then, must be by some 
non-physical means, something which is neither a bodily 
faculty nor in any way bound up with body - neither inside 
nor outside, neither in contact with it nor disjointed from 
it (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 135) 
 
Plato’s Socrates gives his account of the soul as trapped within a physical 
body. The role of the philosopher, then, is to become ‘enlightened’; for his soul 
to ‘return’ to the realm of the Forms for which it yearns for so much. In this 
way, the philosopher need not fear death of the physical body. However, for 
the soul that is preoccupied with, and distracted by, the physical world, the soul 
will return in another physical body, as Socrates says in Plato’s dialogue Phaedo, 
‘…true philosophers make dying their profession, and that to them of all men 
death is least alarming.’ (Plato, 2003: 67e). 
Similarly, Hayy surmises that the human has three fates open to him. Firstly, 
if he or she has no knowledge of God (in Platonic terms, the Form of the 
Good), then at the death of the body the soul also remains ignorant (for Plato, 
the soul would return to another physical body, not necessarily human). 
Secondly, if one does have knowledge of God but freely chooses to be 
preoccupied with bodily pleasures, then the soul will ‘endure prolonged agony 
and infinite pain’ (137: 96) (for Plato, once again, the soul to return to the 
physical realm and continue to yearn to be reunited). Thirdly, if one has 
knowledge of God and ‘turns to Him with his whole being, fasten his thoughts 
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on His goodness, beauty, and majesty, never turning away until death overtakes 
him,’ then, ‘he will live on in infinite joy, bliss, and delight…’ (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 
138). (For Plato, this is to lead the life of the true philosopher; the life of 
Socrates.) 
This realisation by Hayy is coupled with the concern of how is one to ‘fasten 
his thoughts on His goodness, beauty, and majesty, never turning away until 
death overtakes him’. Suhrawardi tells us that we must engage in ascetic 
practices in order to receive personal revelations and visions, or what he calls a 
portion of the ‘light of God’ (al-bariq al-ilahi). Hayy is now at this stage as he 
purifies his body and engages in ascetic habits.  
 
He would stay in a cave, sitting on the stone floor, head 
bent, eyes shut, oblivious to all objects of the senses and 
urges of the body, his thoughts and all his devotion 
focussed on the Being Whose Existence is Necessity, 
alone and without rival (Ibn Tufayl 2009: 148) 
 
Consequently, in the seventh and final stage, Hayy moves from acquired 
knowledge to knowledge ‘by presence’ through direct experience of God. Ibn 
Tufayl provides the reader with a wonderful analogy to explain this form of 
apprehension: 
 
…imagine a child, growing up in a certain city, born blind, 
but otherwise intelligent and well-endowed, with a sound 
memory and an apt mind. Through his remaining 
channels of perception he will get to know the people as 
well as all sorts of animals and objects, and the streets and 
alleys, houses and markets - eventually well enough to 
walk through the city without a guide, recognising at once 
everyone he meets. But colours, and colours alone, he will 
know only by descriptive explanations and ostensive 
definitions. Suppose after he had come this far, his 
eyesight were restored and he could see. He would walk 
all through the town finding nothing in contradiction to 
what he had believed, nor would anything look wrong to 
him. The colours he encountered would conform to the 
guidelines that had been sketched out for him. Still there 
would be two great changes, the second dependent on the 
first: first the daybreak on a new visual world, and second, 
his great joy (Ibn Tufayl 2009: 97) 
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Leaving aside whether it is really possible for a blind person to have any idea 
of colours at all only through ‘descriptive explanations and ostensive 
definitions’, the point here is that, whilst one may describe what religious belief 
is, to experience it is something else and, importantly, emphasis here is on the 
emotional state that results, one of ‘great joy’. As Ibn Tufayl continues in the 
next sentence, ‘Those who merely think and have not reached the level of love 
are like the blind.’ (2009: 97). What is important here is the emotion of love.  
 
Conclusion 
Through spiritual exercises, Hayy, now weary of the physical world, was able 
to enter the sublime state and stay as long as he wished, with little regard for 
the needs of the body. Like the philosopher in Plato’s cave analogy, he would 
return to the depths of the cave, but unwillingly and perceiving it differently, 
craving for the outside and the sun. The seventh stage comes to an end and 
Hayy is now 50 years of age. Near to Hayy’s island was another island 
populated by a people that followed one religion ‘based on the teachings of a 
certain ancient prophet’ (156:136). Two such followers of this religion were 
Absal and Salaman who, for Ibn Tufayl, represent two opposite forms of 
religious expression, whilst remaining adherents to the same religion. Absal was 
the more ‘spiritual’ and mystical (in Islamic terms, a Sufi adherent), whereas 
Salaman was more legalistic and literal (in Islamic terms, a strict follower of 
sharia). Absal preferred the life of solitude, Salaman preferred life in the 
community of believers.  
Absal, desiring for isolation, set sail for Hayy’s island. In time the two met 
and, despite the fact they could not speak the same language and Hayy had 
never seen another human being, ‘Hayy had no doubt that he was one of those 
beings who know the Truth.’ (Ibn Tufayl, 2009: 158). As they grow to know 
each other and to communicate, what Ibn Tufayl is showing us is that Truth is, 
by its nature, the same everywhere. Both Hayy and Absal understood each 
other perfectly in matters of religion, even though both had come from such 
different environments. However, Hayy was shocked to discover that, for most 
people on Absal’s island, they are so embedded in their desire for worldly 
goods that they remain ignorant of the truth, and can only be find guidance 
though written laws rather than their own personal relationship with God. 
Through pity for mankind, Hayy, with Absal, sailed to Absal’s island with the 
intentions of Hayy teaching them what he knew. But, like Plato’s philosopher 
returning to the cave or Nietzsche’s Zarathustra going down to preach, the 
people resented Hayy whenever he strayed from the literal understanding of 
religion. In time, Hayy accepted the fact that most people needed the rituals 
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and law of religion, and he, together with Absal as his disciple, returned to his 
own island until their death. 
Ibn Tufayl’s philosophical novel raises interesting questions concerning 
what constitutes knowledge that continue to pre-occupy us today. We can see 
echoes of this debate in, for example, responses to Richard Dawkins’ view that 
only science (and what constitutes ‘science’) gives us knowledge with that of, 
for example, some theistic philosophers who argue for the importance of 
‘personal explanation’. Also, what is shown here is that to make a distinction 
between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ philosophy frequently obscures the fact that 
the two have always interacted, have asked and, to some extent, answered the 
same questions.  
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